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Prosecutions: Social Media Support to 
Terrorists 
Emily Goldberg Knox* 
On September 21, 2013, a group of al-Shabaab gunmen attacked the Westgate 
Shopping Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, killing nearly seventy civilians. In conjunction with 
this attack, al-Shabaab’s media wing, HSM Press, launched a public relations campaign 
on Twitter claiming responsibility for the attack, posting live information and pictures, 
and taunting Kenyan and global security forces with threats of future action. More 
recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s social media campaign has drawn 
much international attention. This Note discusses whether the U.S. government could 
successfully pursue material support to terrorist charges against social media companies 
for allowing designated foreign terrorist organizations to use their services and, if so, 
the constitutional and policy implications. 
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Introduction 
On September 21, 2013, a group of al-Shabaab1 gunmen attacked 
the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, killing nearly seventy 
civilians. Al-Shabaab’s media wing, HSM Press, launched a public 
relations campaign on Twitter claiming responsibility for the attack, 
posting live information and pictures, and taunting Kenyan and global 
 
 1. Al-Shabaab is a Somali jihadist group that has sworn allegiance to al-Qaeda. See Bureau of 
Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 256, 264 (2012), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/195768.pdf. 
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security forces with threats of future action.2 Although Twitter 
suspended several al-Shabaab accounts after receiving reports of abuse,3 
the incident caused a spike in public discussion about preventing terrorist 
groups from using social media to capture the public’s attention with 
sensational attacks, recruit new members, fundraise, and spread their 
message. 
More recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (“ISIL”)4 
has used social media to advance its cause, leading to attempts to 
diminish the group’s social media capacity.5 As of late August 2014, ISIL 
controlled between 12,000 and 35,000 square miles of territory in Iraq 
and Syria.6 At least some of the group’s success can be linked to its 
massive public relations campaign.7 Not only has the group used social 
media to post pictures of their violent deeds—including an alleged mass 
killing of Iraqi government soldiers—but ISIL also created an Arabic 
language mobile application called “The Dawn of Glad Tidings.”8 The 
application posts tweets to the Twitter accounts of those who have signed 
up, with content dictated by ISIL.9 Several hundred users purchased the 
app through the Google Play store, but the app is only one indication of 
ISIL’s online success.10 According to J.M. Berger, ISIL regularly 
“employs social-media strategies [to] inflate and control its message.”11 
 
 2. Erik Ortiz, Al Shabab’s Alleged Twitter Account Taunts Kenyan Officials Following Mall 
Rampage, N.Y. Daily News (Sept. 24, 2013, 12:54 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/ 
terrorists-tweeting-new-account-claims-kenyan-mall-militants-article-1.1465961. 
 3. J.M. Berger, Twitter’s Week of Reckoning, Foreign Policy Mag. (Oct. 1, 2013), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/01/twitters_week_of_reckoning. 
 4. This group is also commonly referred to as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) or 
Islamic State (“IS”), but I use ISIL in conformity with the State Department. See Bureau of 
Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. Dep’t of State, http://go.usa.gov/m9xG (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
 5. Hannah Jane Parkinson, James Foley: How Social Media is Fighting Back Against Isis 
Propaganda, Guardian (Aug. 20, 2014, 11:06 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2014/aug/20/james-foley-how-social-media-is-fighting-back-against-isis-propaganda.  
 6. Kathy Gilsinan, The Many Ways to Map the Islamic ‘State’, Atlantic (Aug. 27, 2014, 
3:39 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-many-ways-to-map-theislamic-
state/379196. Despite recent airstrikes on ISIL targets, the group continued to make gains, particularly 
in Syria. Daren Butler & Oliver Holmes, Islamic State Seizes Large Areas of Syrian Town Despite 
Airstrikes, Reuters, Oct. 9, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/09/us-mideast-
crisis-idUSKCN0HX0XF20141009. Only time will tell whether the airstrikes will be effective in 
reversing this trend. 
 7. See Natalie Andrews & Felicia Schwartz, Islamic State Pushes Social-Media Battle With 
West, Wall St. J. (Aug. 22, 2014, 12:40 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/isis-pushes-social-media-
battle-with-west-1408725614.  
 8. J.M. Berger, How ISIS Games Twitter, Atlantic (June 16, 2014, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-media-strategy/372856. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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Consistent with this discussion of al-Shabaab and ISIL, this Note 
focuses only on social media accounts of Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
(“FTOs”) or of their known affiliates.12 For example, Andalus Media, 
the media wing of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (“AQIM”), had an 
account on Twitter with over 13,000 followers,13 as well as a page on 
Facebook with over 11,000 “likes.”14 Although it is impossible to know 
for certain whether these accounts do indeed belong to Andalus Media, 
the content posted suggests they are affiliated with AQIM. 
The dangers that can flow from terrorists using social media, 
discussed in Part II, are real and not limited to ISIL and al-Shabaab. 
Counterterrorism officials have sought to mitigate the effect of these 
dangers, but one very real option is to shut terrorist groups out of social 
media.15 The material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B, 
may be a ready tool for the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to force 
social media companies to remove terrorist groups from their services. 
As discussed below, § 2339B, which prohibits providing material support 
or resources to terrorist organizations, could be interpreted to reach 
social media companies. The Supreme Court’s decision in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project (“HLP”),16 the first First Amendment 
challenge to a national security law since 2001,17 could arguably support 
such an interpretation. Indeed, in 2011, Glenn Greenwald speculated 
that the DOJ “could consider Twitter’s providing of a forum to a 
designated Terrorist organization to constitute the crime of ‘material 
support of Terrorism.’”18 The following year, the pro-Israel group 
 
 12. For an explanation of FTOs, see infra note 51. This Note only addresses FTOs because the 
government specifically designates them as terrorist organizations and publishes this information. This 
Note does not consider accounts belonging to, or purporting to belong to, individuals. 
 13. Andalus Media, Twitter, https://twitter.com/Andalus_Media (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). This 
account has since been suspended. The account profile claimed to belong to al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb. The account picture—one of Andalus Media’s logos—and the content of the account 
suggest the account was authentic. 
 14. Islamic Maghreb, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/Maghreb.Islamic (last visited Oct. 9, 
2013). The administrators of this account posted various jihadist press releases and pictures, and the 
profile picture was one of the group’s logos, suggesting the account was authentic. This account was 
suspended as of Nov. 13, 2013.  
 15. This Note focuses specifically on social media given its increasing attractiveness to terrorist 
groups. See generally Aaron Y. Zelin, #Jihad’s Social Media Trend, Foreign Policy (Feb. 5, 2013, 2:26 
PM), http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/02/05/jihad_social_media_trend (claiming that jihadi 
propaganda is increasingly migrating from web forums to social media); Aaron Y. Zelin, The State 
of Global Jihad Online, New Am. Found. 5–6 (2013), available at http://www.newamerica.net/sites/ 
newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Zelin_Global%20Jihad%20Online_NAF.pdf (providing a history of 
terrorist use of social media platforms). 
 16. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 17. Amanda Shanor, Beyond Humanitarian Law Project: Promoting Human Rights in a Post-9/11 
World, 34 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 519, 520 (2011). 
 18. Glenn Greenwald, Can the U.S. Government Close Social Media Accounts?, Salon (Dec. 20, 
2011, 1:15 AM), http://www.salon.com/2011/12/20/the_u_s_government_targets_twitter_terrorism/.  
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Christians United for Israel began a petition campaign demanding that 
the U.S. government pursue charges against Twitter, under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339A, for providing services to Hamas.19 
Pursuing criminal charges against the social media companies that 
terrorist organizations use in an “official” capacity would be one way to 
force them off of social media. This Note argues, however, that the U.S. 
government should not avail itself of this option, and if it does, that 
courts should not permit it.20 This Note argues that the law should not be 
interpreted to allow for a finding of criminal liability in such instances for 
two reasons: (1) courts should construe the Supreme Court’s 
requirement of “coordination” in HLP narrowly, in conformity with the 
rule of lenity,21 and (2) even if courts interpret “coordination” broadly, 
social media companies should have a valid First Amendment defense. 
Additionally, this Note urges Congress to amend the law to require 
specific intent.  
Part I of this Note details the dangers presented by terrorists using 
social media. Part II discusses the material support statutes and the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of these statutes in HLP. Part II also 
explains why and on what grounds the prosecution of social media 
companies could be a tool in the Executive Branch’s counterterrorism 
toolbox. Part III analyzes some questions left unanswered by HLP, 
including the viability of adopting a broad “coordination” requirement to 
convict under § 2339B. Finally, Part IV proposes recommendations: a 
narrow reading of § 2339B, the availability of a First Amendment 
defense, and the addition of a specific intent requirement to § 2339B. 
I.  The Dangers of Terrorists Using Social Media 
The Westgate attack, which al-Shabaab live-tweeted, is perhaps the 
most notorious example to date of a terrorist group using social media to 
spread its message, but it is not the first to raise concerns about the use of 
social media to promote terrorism. Given the widespread focus on 
Twitter, one might think it is the only social media company terrorist 
organizations use, but these groups use nearly all forms of social media. 
A 2010 Department of Homeland Security report announced that 
extremists were focusing on Facebook as a way to identify sympathizers 
 
 19. Daniel Halper, Christian Group Petitions Twitter to Ban Terrorist Group Hamas, Weekly 
Standard (Nov. 19, 2012, 4:12 PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/christian-group-petitions-
twitter-ban-terrorist-group-hamas_663678.html. As explained in Part II.C, §2339A would not provide 
the legal authority to prosecute social media sites because it requires specific intent to further the 
organization’s terrorist activities. 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. “[T]he rule of lenity indicates that doubts about the ambit of criminal statutes should be 
resolved against criminal liability.” William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory 
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 359 n.139 (1990). 
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and to disseminate bomb-making instructions.22 Additionally, YouTube 
“has become a significant platform for jihadist groups and supporters, 
fostering a thriving subculture of jihadists who use YouTube to share 
propaganda, communicate with each other, and recruit new individuals 
to the jihadist cause.”23 This list is not exhaustive, as terrorist groups also 
use other sites, including Flickr and Instagram.24 
Terrorist use of social media poses three potentially serious threats 
to national security. First, social media allows terrorist groups to direct 
the coverage of their attacks by posting videos, analysis, and 
commentary. Essentially, the traditional media loses its monopoly on 
covering and interpreting these incidents and gives terrorist groups the 
ability to convey their messages directly—an option not generally 
provided by conventional media sources. Although the traditional media 
sometimes publishes terrorist media and literature (“propaganda”), the 
propaganda is generally part of the message rather than the message. 
Though media outlets do have inherent biases, they are (generally) not 
aiming to further any specific cause. This is an important distinction. 
Second, social media provides terrorist organizations with a way to 
raise money, recruit new members, spread propaganda, and spread their 
ideology (which sometimes advocates the use of violence) to a larger 
audience with minimal effort.25 Although the same can be said of 
websites and forums operated by terrorists directly, social media is 
uniquely dangerous because it allows the terrorist group to reach 
 
 22. Nick Allen, Facebook Emerges as ‘Terrorist Recruiting Ground’, Telegraph (Dec. 10, 2010, 
11:43 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/8195214/Facebook-emerges-as-terrorist-
recruiting-ground.html. 
 23. Rita Katz & Josh Devon, Jihad on YouTube, Site Intel Group (Jan. 15, 2014), 
https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Featured-Article/jihad-on-youtube.html. 
 24. See Laura Ryan, Why Terrorists Love Twitter, Nat’l J. (June 2, 2014), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/why-terrorists-love-twitter-20140602. See also Alexi Oreskovic & 
Lesley Wroughton, Islamic State’s Twitter Silence Raises Questions, Reuters, Sept. 13, 2014, available 
at http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/09/13/us-iraq-crisis-twitter-idINKBN0H800K20140913 (“Some 
experts say the militants may have increasingly taken to other online services such as Russia’s 
VKontakte and Diaspora . . . .”).  
 25. Gregory S. McNeal, Cyber Embargo: Countering the Internet Jihad, 39 Case W. Res. J. 
Int’l L. 789, 794 (2007–08). See Joby Warrick, Islamist Rebels in Syria Use Faces of the Dead to Lure 
the Living, Wash. Post (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/islamist-rebels-in-syria-use-faces-of-the-dead-to-lure-the-living/2013/11/04/10d03480-433d-
11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html (“Although jihadists have long used the Internet to communicate 
messages from leaders or spread images of battle, Syrian rebel groups are flocking to Web sites such as 
Twitter, Instagram and Flickr to create new ways to recruit, train, raise money, debate theology and 
coordinate strategy . . . . Twitter is not just a communications tool but also an online cash machine, 
useful for soliciting donations . . . . Still others employ YouTube or Facebook to trumpet their 
battlefield successes or to document alleged atrocities by their opponents. . . . [Jabhat al-Nusra, which 
has been labeled a terrorist organization,] use[s] Twitter and Facebook in much the same way that 
corporations and government agencies in the United States do.”). 
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individuals who might not otherwise access a terrorist website.26 
Generally, individuals accessing terrorist websites have intentionally 
located those websites, but with terrorists on social media, individuals 
may come across the propaganda accidentally, for example, by searching 
for “moderate” sermons or by simply clicking on links posted by friends 
or friends of friends. Therefore, social media “lowers the barrier of 
access” to terrorist propaganda.27 
Finally, terrorist groups can use social media to search for 
individuals who might be particularly vulnerable to their ideology, thus 
making their recruitment efforts more effective.28 A 2012 report issued 
by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime explains: 
Terrorist propaganda is often tailored to appeal to vulnerable and 
marginalized groups in society. The process of recruitment and 
radicalization commonly capitalizes on an individual’s sentiments of 
injustice, exclusion or humiliation. Propaganda may be adapted to 
account for demographic factors, such as age or gender, as well as 
social or economic circumstances.29 
The amount of information available about any given person on social 
media is astonishing. This information helps the recruiter individualize 
her efforts. 
Recognizing these dangers, American officials have occasionally 
requested that social media companies shut down accounts affiliated with 
terrorist organizations.30 Most recently, after the execution of reporter 
 
 26. Terrorist websites are not as easily accessible as one might think. These websites change 
often, and as quickly as one goes down, another goes up. Furthermore, many would-be users of these 
sites fear that counterterror operatives are monitoring the sites.  
 27. Neal Ungerleider, Despite Ban, YouTube is Still a Hotbed of Terrorist Group Video 
Propaganda, Fast Company (Nov. 12, 2010, 1:05 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/1701383/despite-
ban-youtube-still-hotbed-terrorist-group-video-propaganda (citing and quoting Thomas Hegghammer, 
Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment). 
 28. For example, in 2009, five Americans were arrested in Pakistan, having traveled there to join 
a terrorist group. The group allegedly recruited them and encouraged them to travel to Pakistan via 
YouTube. Katz & Devon, supra note 23. See Jesse Paul, Analyst Group: Colorado Teens Spoke with 
Top Islamic State Terrorists, Denver Post (Oct. 29, 2014, 3:54 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ 
ci_26823939/analyst-group-colorado-teens-spoke-top-islamic-state (discussing three teenage girls who 
attempted to join ISIL after being recruited and radicalized on social media).  
 29. United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime, The Use of the Internet for Terrorist 
Purposes 5 (2012) (citation omitted). 
 30. This Note only addresses efforts by the U.S. government to block multinational terrorists 
from using social media. Other countries have made similar efforts. Most notable is the Clean IT 
project, funded by the Prevention of and Fight Against Crime Programme of the European 
Commission and supported by Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Belgium. 
See Donna Anderson, Clean IT Leak Shows Plans for Large-Scale European Internet Surveillance, 
InfoWars.com (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.infowars.com/clean-it-leak-shows-plans-for-large-scale-
european-internet-surveillance. Among other things, the group proposed “that Internet companies use 
stricter terms of service agreements to ban unwelcome activity.” Id. Private actors have also attempted 
to eliminate terrorist presence on social media through the civil remedy in 18 U.S.C. § 2333. For 
example, an Israeli NGO, Shurat Hadin, threatened to sue Facebook if it did not “immediately and 
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James Foley, the State Department acknowledged that, along with the 
Department of Defense, it “reach[ed] out to social media sites like 
Twitter and YouTube . . . to highlight for them accounts that may be 
violating their own usage policy.”31 Although Twitter attempted to 
remove tweets embedding the execution video or screenshots taken from 
it, and YouTube removed the video from its site, it is unclear whether 
the action was taken in response to the government’s request or because 
violence violates their terms of service.32 
 This was not the first time that government officials had requested 
social media sites to suspend or take down accounts affiliated with or 
related to FTOs. In 2011, American officials announced that they were 
“looking closely” at al-Shabaab’s use of Twitter and exploring legal 
options to shut down the account.33 That same year, then-Senator Joe 
Lieberman requested that Twitter suspend all Taliban-related accounts.34 
During the 2012 conflict between Israel and Hamas, seven House 
Republicans asked the FBI to force Twitter to shut down Hamas’s 
official account, as well as those purported to belong to Hezbollah and 
al-Shabaab.35 These requests were rejected. Although none of the 
reports discusses whether the officials asserted that Twitter had a legal 
obligation to take action, social media companies would probably comply 
with a government request to suspend identified terrorist accounts “if the 
government [had] a legally binding order and [made] it clear that the 
content in question [was] against the law.”36 
 
permanently take down a social media site provided to ‘15 ministers of Iran.’” Yonah J. Bob, Israeli 
NGO Threatens to Sue Facebook for Hosting Iranian Ministers, Jerusalem Post (Sept. 16, 2013, 7:52 
PM), http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Israeli-NGO-threatens-to-sue-Facebook-for-hosting-Iranian-
ministers-326280. 
 31. Marie Harf, Deputy Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, Daily Press Briefing (Aug. 21, 2014), 
transcript available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/08/230798.htm#ISIL.  
 32. Parkinson, supra note 5. YouTube stated “that it doesn’t allow members of foreign terrorist 
organisations [sic] to have YouTube accounts, or people affiliated with terrorist organisations [sic].” 
Id. 
 33. Jeffrey Gettleman, U.S. Considers Combatting Somali Militants’ Twitter Use, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 19, 2011, at A5. In 2012, BBC News reported that “the United States has attempted to close the 
al-Shabab account [on Twitter], but had lacked the legal means to force Twitter to do so.” Somalia’s 
al-Shabab Twitter Account Stopped Again, BBC News (Sept. 6, 2013, 7:27 AM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23987802. 
 34. Ben Farmer, Congress Calls on Twitter to Block Taliban, Telegraph (Dec. 25, 2011, 5:07 
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/8972884/Congress-calls-on-Twitter-to-block-
Taliban.html. 
 35. Julian Pecquet, Gaza Violence Leads Lawmakers to Call for Shuttering Terror Groups on 
Twitter, Hill (Nov. 23, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/terrorism/269141-gaza-
violence-leads-lawmakers-to-call-for-twitter-shuttering. 
 36. Deana Kjuka, How Social Networks are Dealing with Terrorists, Radio Free Europe Radio 
Liberty (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.rferl.org/content/twitter-facebook-terrorists/24906583.html (citing 
and quoting Rebecca MacKinnon, an expert on Internet censorship and a senior fellow at the New 
America Foundation). 
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II.  Criminalizing Material Support 
A. Background and Purpose 
Following the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, 
Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
of 1994, which sought to prevent the provision of financial support to 
terrorist organizations.37 Based on a finding that certain “foreign 
organizations known to engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their 
criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates 
that conduct,” Congress prohibited the provision of “material support or 
resources” to these organizations.38 The first material support statute, 
18 U.S.C. § 2339A, was part of this legislation. 
Following the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, Congress passed the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).39 A 
second statute prohibiting the provision of material support to terrorists, 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B, was included in AEDPA to address criticism that 
§ 2339A left open the possibility that an individual could legally donate 
money to a terrorist group so long as the donor thought the money 
would be spent on political or social services provided by the group.40 
Of the two material support statutes, § 2339B has been at the heart 
of the DOJ’s terrorism prosecution efforts, though it was rarely used 
before the September 11 attacks.41 According to David Cole, the 
material support statutes “allow for the prosecution and conviction of 
individuals based more on what the government fears might happen in 
the future than on the wrongfulness of their past conduct.”42 
B. Overview of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2339A and 2339B 
Section 2339A prohibits the provision of “material support or 
resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation 
for, or in carrying out” an offense identified as a federal crime of 
 
 37. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 120005, 
108 Stat. 1796, 2022–23. 
 38. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Publ. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7)–
301(b), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247. 
 39. Id. § 303, 110 Stat. 1214, 1250. 
 40. Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of 
Prevention, 42 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 13 (2005) (citation omitted). This criticism was based on 
congressional findings that “the provision of funds to organizations that engage in terrorism serves to 
facilitate their terrorist endeavors regardless of whether the funds, in whole or in part, are intended or 
claimed to be used for non-violent purposes.” Id. at 15 (citing S. 390, 104th Cong. § 301 (1995) 
(proposing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1)(G))). 
 41. Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., R41333, Terrorist Material Support: An Overview 
of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B 1, 1 n.1 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41333.pdf. 
 42. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 
97 Calif. L. Rev. 693, 723 (2009). 
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terrorism.43 This section outlaws support for the crimes a terrorist has 
committed or may be planning to commit. Section 2339A requires that a 
defendant know or intend that the support will assist in the commission 
of a federal crime of terrorism.44 Conviction for a violation of § 2339A is 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than fifteen years and/or a fine 
of not more than $250,000.45 
Section 2339B undoubtedly seeks to extend criminal liability beyond 
the confines of § 2339A. Section 2339B outlaws “knowingly provid[ing] 
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”46 To 
violate this statute, an individual or entity47 “must have knowledge that 
the organization is a designated terrorist organization . . . that the 
organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity . . . or that the 
organization has engaged or engages in terrorism.”48 Therefore, a 
conviction for providing material support to terrorist organizations under 
§ 2339B requires that the jury find (1) that the accused provided material 
support, and (2) that the accused knew that the beneficiary of the 
support was a designated terrorist organization or knew that it engaged 
in terrorism.49 
Terrorist organizations, as defined in these statutes, are “foreign 
organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance 
with § 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).”50 Section 
219 authorizes the Secretary of State to designate an organization as a 
FTO if she finds that: 
[T]he organization is a foreign organization; the organization engages 
in terrorist activity ( . . . or retains the capability and intent to engage in 
terrorist activity or terrorism); and the terrorist activity or terrorism of 
the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or 
the national security of the United States.51 
As of July 2014, the State Department had designated approximately 
fifty organizations as FTOs, including al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda, Hamas, 
Hezbollah, and the Shining Path.52 These statutes also reach 
organizations that have engaged in or currently engage in “terrorist 
activity,” as defined by § 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and 
 
 43. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2014) (emphasis added). 
 44. Doyle, supra note 41, at 15, 19. 
 45. Id. at 20. Organizational defendants face a fine of not more than $500,000. Id. 
 46. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a). 
 47. According to the statute, “the term ‘person’ means any individual or entity capable of holding 
a legal or beneficial interest in property.” Id. § 2331(3). 
 48. Id. § 2339B(a)(1). 
 49. Doyle, supra note 41, at 9. 
 50. Bureau of Counterterrorism, supra note 4. 
 51. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2014). 
 52. For the full list see Bureau of Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on 
Terrorism 2012, at 244–45 (2013), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210204.pdf. 
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Nationality Act,53 or “terrorism,” as defined by § 140(d)(2) of the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act.54 Conviction for a violation of 
§ 2339B is punishable by fine or by imprisonment for not more than 
fifteen years, or both, and if the death of any person results from the 
commission of the offense, the offender “shall be imprisoned for any 
term of years or for life.”55 
 Section 2339A is unlikely to provide the legal authority to prosecute 
social media companies because it requires specific intent to further the 
organization’s terrorist activities. Section 2339B, however, could provide 
the requisite legal authority assuming the inquiry is limited only to 
accounts that purport to be or are clearly linked to FTOs. As such, the 
remainder of this Note deals exclusively with § 2339B. 
1. Statutory Definition of Material Support 
The scope of the term “material support or resources” has been 
controversial since it was first defined in 1996.56 As the statute is 
currently written: 
[T]he term “material support or resources” means any property, 
tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary 
instruments, or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, 
expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or 
include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious 
materials.57 
This definition applies to the term as used in both § 2339A and 
§ 2339B.58 Whether the term “material” requires that the support 
provided be important or of great consequence remains unclear based 
upon existing judicial precedent.59 As such, the statutory definition 
covers a wide range of activities. 
 
 53. “Terrorist activity” is defined as “any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place 
where it is committed (or which, if it had been committed in the United States, would be unlawful 
under the laws of the United States or any State)” and includes, among other things, the hijacking or 
sabotage of any conveyance; hostage taking; assassinations; or the use of biological or chemical agents, 
or nuclear weapons. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). 
 54. “Terrorism” is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2014). 
 55. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2014). 
 56. Doyle, supra note 41, at 4. 
 57. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1); see § 2339B(g)(4). 
 58. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4). 
 59. Justice Breyer reads the term “material” to require support that is of “importance or great 
consequence.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 57 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The 
majority did not address this aspect of the statute. 
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2. The Decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 
Soon after § 2339B was enacted, groups seeking to provide support 
for the humanitarian and political activities of two designated terrorist 
organizations sought to enjoin enforcement of the criminal ban against 
their provision of support for these organizations.60 The Humanitarian 
Law Project (“HLP”), a U.S. based organization with consultative status 
to the United Nations, sought to “provide support for the humanitarian 
and political activities of the PKK [Kurdistan Workers Party] and the 
LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] in the form of monetary 
contributions, other tangible aid, legal training, and political advocacy.”61 
HLP primarily argued that prohibiting this type of conduct violated their 
freedom of speech under the First Amendment.62 The group’s central 
argument was that the support they sought to provide constituted 
political speech,63 the material support statute imposed a content-based 
restriction on speech,64 and that the Constitution prohibits content-based 
restrictions on political speech urging lawful goals, specifically where 
there is no intent to further the unlawful goals of the group.65 The DOJ 
contended that the statute does not target speech, per se, but rather that 
it regulates the conduct of providing support to designated terrorist 
organizations, even if the support takes the form of speech.66 
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute as applied to 
HLP’s desired conduct, but recognized that “the scope of the material-
support statute may not be clear in every application.”67 Writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice Roberts rejected HLP’s contention that the 
statute requires proof that a defendant intended to further a foreign 
terrorist organization’s illegal activities.68 Instead, the Court held that the 
necessary mental state for a violation of § 2339B is “knowledge about the 
organization’s connection to terrorism, not specific intent to further the 
organization’s terrorist activities.”69 
 
 60. Id. at 11 (majority opinion). 
 61. Id. at 10. 
 62. Id. at 10–11. 
 63. Id. at 25. 
 64. Brief for the Respondents at 47–50, Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (Nos. 08-1498, 09-
89); Reply Brief for Humanitarian Law Project, et al. at 27–30, Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 
(Nos. 08-1498, 09-89). 
 65. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 10–11. 
 66. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 64, at 44–47 (“Section 2339B regulates conduct without 
regard to its expressive content . . . Section 2339B does not target expression at all . . . . Rather, Section 
2339B aims at a certain type of conduct: the provision of material support or resources to foreign 
terrorist organizations. . . . [I]t aims at the act of giving material support to terrorists—regardless 
whether accomplished through words . . . .”). 
 67. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 21. 
 68. Id. at 16–17.  
 69. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Additionally, the Court determined that the statute was not 
impermissibly vague as applied to the particular facts at issue. In so 
doing, the Court clarified the term “service” found in the statutory 
definition of “material support and resources.” The Court held that the 
term “refers to concerted activity, not independent advocacy.”70 Thus, 
the term “service” covers only “advocacy performed in coordination 
with, or at the direction of, a foreign terrorist organization.”71 The Court 
refused to determine how much direction or coordination would be 
necessary because it would require “sheer speculation.”72 However, the 
Court acknowledged that “‘gradations of fact or charge would make a 
difference as to criminal liability,’ and so ‘adjudication of the reach and 
constitutionality of [the statute] must await a concrete fact situation.’”73 
Finally, the Court determined that the material support statute, as 
applied to HLP, did not violate the First Amendment.74 The Court 
rejected the argument that the statute banned “pure political speech,”75 
instead finding that: 
Congress has prohibited “material support,” which most often does not 
take the form of speech. And when it does, the statute is carefully 
drawn to cover only a narrow category of speech to, under the 
direction of, or in coordination with foreign groups that the speaker 
knows to be terrorist organizations.76 
As a result, our constitutional jurisprudence permits the government to 
outlaw at least some speech to or with foreign designated groups.77 
The majority reached this conclusion because material support 
“helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups—legitimacy that makes 
it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise 
funds—all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.”78 The majority did 
recognize, however, that not all future applications of the statute to 
speech or advocacy would survive First Amendment scrutiny.79 The 
Court implied that because any restriction on speech would be content-
based, courts should apply a level of scrutiny more rigorous than 
 
 70. Id. at 23–24 (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2075 (1993) (defining 
“service” to mean “the performance of work commanded or paid for by another: a servant’s duty: 
attendance on a superior”; or “an act done for the benefit or at the command of another”). Therefore, 
“independent advocacy . . . is not prohibited by § 2339B.” Id. at 24. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 25. 
 73. Id. (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 20 (1965)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 26. 
 77. Shanor, supra note 17, at 519–20. The Court’s holding suggested that the material support 
statute could not be applied to speech constituting the provision of a service to domestic groups. Id. 
 78. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 30. 
 79. Id. at 39. 
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intermediate scrutiny, but did not explicitly state whether that should be 
strict scrutiny or something in between.80 
C. Prosecuting Social Media Companies Under Section 2339B 
As mentioned above, § 2339A is not a viable option as applied to 
the activities of social media companies because of the specific intent 
requirement. Section 2339B, however, which requires only “knowledge 
about the organization’s connection to terrorism,”81 could conceivably be 
applied to social media websites used by designated FTOs who claim on 
their account profile to be acting on behalf of such an organization. This 
is in line with the DOJ’s approach to terrorism prosecutions over the past 
decade.82 
Section 2339B would provide the most viable means of prosecuting 
social media companies for allowing FTOs to use their product because 
the statute does not require intent to further the goals of the supported 
organization. Section 2339A outlaws “support for the crimes a terrorist 
has committed or may be planning to commit,”83 and requires that the 
offense be committed with the intent of promoting a federal crime of 
terrorism.84 Without direct evidence, it would be far-fetched to assert 
that legitimate businesses, such as social media companies, act intending 
to promote federal terrorism crimes. The Supreme Court’s elimination of 
a specific intent requirement reinforces this interpretation.85 
Although the material support statute has never been used against a 
social media company,86 the DOJ has used the statute to prosecute those 
responsible for hosting terrorist content on their websites. For example, 
in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the DOJ suggested that 
website administrators would be held criminally liable for terrorist 
activity on their websites.87 In accordance with this policy, Sami Al-
Hussayen was prosecuted under the material support statutes for 
establishing a series of Internet sites, some of which recruited members 
and instigated “acts of violence and terrorism.”88 
The DOJ has continued prosecuting founders and administrators of 
websites known to have links to terrorism.89 In 2010, the DOJ charged 
 
 80. Id. at 27–28. 
 81. Id. at 16–17. 
 82. Doyle, supra note 41, at 1. 
 83. Id. at 15. 
 84. United States v. Awan, 607 F.3d 306, 316 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 85. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 86. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 818–19. 
 87. Eric Lipton & Eric Lichtblau, Online and Even Near Home, A New Front Is Opening in the 
Global Terror Battle, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 2004, at A12. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Press Release, FBI, Leader of Revolution Muslim Pleads Guilty to Using Internet to 
Solicit Murder and Encourage Violent Extremism (Feb. 9, 2012), available at 
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Zachary Chesser, the founder of a radical website, with attempting to 
provide material support to a designated FTO.90 Two years later, the FBI 
arrested Jesse Curtis Morton, the leader and founder of the Revolution 
Muslim Organization’s website. Morton later pled guilty “to using his 
position as a leader of Revolution Muslim Organization’s Internet sites 
to conspire to solicit murder, make threatening communications, and 
using the Internet to place others in fear.”91 While discussing Morton’s 
plea, James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s 
Washington Field Office, stated that “[i]ndividuals such as Morton who 
encourage violence and create fear over the internet are a danger to our 
society and to the freedoms we enjoy as citizens,” and therefore, “the 
FBI will continue to pursue those who promulgate violent extremism and 
promote the radicalization of others.”92 
President Barack Obama’s policy on countering online 
radicalization could be one reason why the material support statutes 
have been used against website hosts and founders, but not against social 
media companies. Although the Obama administration “investigate[s] 
and prosecute[s] those who use the Internet to recruit others to plan or 
carry out acts of violence,”93 the administration does not attempt to 
remove them from the web.94 President Obama’s approach stands in 
contrast to that of President George W. Bush’s administration, which 
“[sought] to deny the Internet to our terrorist enemies as an effective 
safe haven for their recruitment, fund-raising, training, and operational 
planning.”95 To that end, President Bush proposed closing any gaps in 
the U.S. legal system that would allow terrorists to exploit virtual safe 
havens and worked to ensure that law enforcement had “the necessary 
 
http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2012/leader-of-revolution-muslim-pleads-guilty-to-
using-internet-to-solicit-murder-and-encourage-violent-extremism [hereinafter Press Release, Leader 
Pleads Guilty to Using Internet to Solicit Murder]; Press Release, FBI, Leader of ‘Revolution Muslim’ 
Websites Pleads Guilty to Using Internet to Threaten Jewish Organizations (Oct. 31, 2013), available 
at http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2013/leader-of-revolution-muslim-website-pleads-
guilty-to-using-internet-to-threaten-jewish-organizations. 
 90. Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, Zachary Chesser: A Case 
Study in Online Islamist Radicalization and its Meaning for the Threat of Homegrown 
Terrorism 5–6 (2012), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/zachary-chesser-a-case-
study-in-online-radicalization. Chesser founded themujahidblog.com, which was “intended to be ‘a 
website dedicated to those who give their lives for this religion.’” Id. at 5. 
 91. Press Release, Leader Pleads Guilty to Using Internet to Solicit Murder, supra note 89. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Quintan Wiktorowicz, Working to Counter Online Radicalization to Violence in the United 
States, White House Blog (Feb. 5, 2013, 10:02 AM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/02/05/working-counter-online-radicalization-violence-united-states. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Homeland Sec. Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security 21 (2007), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_homelandsecurity_2007.pdf. 
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and proper mix of tools and authorities to defeat the threats of the 21st 
century.”96 
The difference in counterterrorism policies and approaches between 
the two administrations demonstrates that a future president or Attorney 
General could support prosecuting social media corporations that 
provide a safe-haven to terrorist groups. Only time will tell how future 
administrations will address the problem of terrorists on the social 
media.97 
III.  The Ambiguity of the “Coordination” Requirement 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the material support statute 
in HLP has substantially impacted the executive branch’s ability to 
prosecute social media companies. The Court’s vague reference to a 
“coordination” requirement has caused more problems than it likely 
envisioned. 
During oral argument, counsel for HLP, David Cole, expressed 
concern that a broad application of the statute would extend it too far. 
Cole posed the question of whether newspapers publishing op-eds by 
Hamas spokespersons could be found liable for providing material 
support to Hamas, a designated foreign terrorist organization. Justice 
Scalia responded that the Court could “cross that bridge” when 
necessary to do so.98 Cole’s comment concerned whether the traditional 
media could be held liable under the material support statute, and the 
question remains unanswered.  
The Court’s analysis in HLP suggests there are three elements the 
government must prove for a defendant social media company to be 
found liable for providing material support: (1) that the social media 
company is providing a service to an FTO; (2) that the service is being 
performed “in coordination with, or at the direction of, a foreign terrorist 
organization;”99 and (3) that the social media company has the requisite 
intent. Each of these elements is addressed below in turn. 
 
 96. Id. at 22. 
 97. In 2004, the U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York argued that merely using 
communications equipment in furtherance of a designated terrorist organization’s goals constituted 
criminal conduct. United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). This argument was 
ultimately unsuccessful. Id. However, the argument used in Sattar suggests that it is not so far-fetched 
to believe that the DOJ would endorse a policy of prosecuting social media companies under the 
material support statute. 
 98. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) 
(Nos. 08-1498, 09-89). 
 99. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 24. 
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A. Social Networking as a Service 
This Subpart addresses whether social media companies are 
providing a “service” as envisioned by Congress in the material support 
statute. As a reminder, 
[T]he term “material support or resources” means any property, 
tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary 
instruments, or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, 
expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or 
include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious 
materials.100 
Looking at the plain language, the use of the word “or” indicates 
that the statute prohibits the provision of property, service, financial 
securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice, etc. 
Currency or monetary instruments, which are listed after “service,” are 
merely a list of what might be found to be a service, but it is not 
exclusive—the use of the word “including” indicates the list is merely 
illustrative.101 Indeed, in HLP, the Supreme Court found that advocacy 
was a prohibited “service” under the statute.102 Then-Solicitor General 
Elena Kagan’s statement as to the government’s view of the term’s 
breadth supports a broad interpretation of the term. At oral argument, 
Kagan asserted that a true service is “something that will help the foreign 
organization in whatever it does.”103 From all of this, it becomes clear 
that § 2339B and the definition of material support or resources covers a 
broad range of activities. 
The legislative history, while sparse, also supports a broad 
interpretation of the term “service.” “Service” was added to the 
definition of “material support or resources” in the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.104 Congressman Mark Green 
from Wisconsin, who ultimately voted against the bill, praised the 
clarification and breadth of the definition of “material support,” stating: 
Every terrorist act is really the result of a terrorist chain made of many 
links—from those evil figures who pull the trigger or drive the rigged 
truck to those who provide “material support” to terrorists. . . . If we 
are going to be successful in the long run in our fight against terrorism, 
we must attack every link in that chain. As the author of this session’s 
 
 100. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2014); see also id. § 2339B(g)(4). 
 101. The use of “the participle including typically indicates a partial list.” Black’s Law Dictionary 
831 (9th ed. 2009). 
 102. See generally Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1. 
 103. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 98, at 42. 
 104. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6603(b), 
118 Stat. 3762 (codified at 18 U.S.C § 2339A(b)(3)). 
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primary bill strengthening material support laws, I’m proud of the 
work I’ve done on this front, and glad to see much of it in this bill.105 
Congressman Rush Holt of New Jersey, who ultimately supported the 
bill, expressed concern about “the apparently sweeping definition of 
what ‘providing material support’ to terrorists” meant in the context of 
this bill.106 Finally, Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin, who also voted 
in favor of the bill, expressed concern that, although the “material 
support provision adopted by the conference [was] not as broad as the 
provision contained in the House bill” members of Congress did not 
have sufficient time to analyze “its full implications.”107 While these 
individuals did not necessarily agree on the final disposition of the bill, it 
is clear that Congress was aware that the language was broad, and thus, 
Congress could have modified the language if it had intended the 
definition to be read more narrowly. 
Finally, terrorists on social media present precisely the evil Congress 
sought to cure in passing the material support statutes. According to the 
Supreme Court, the prohibition against providing material support stems 
from the fact that material support “help[s] lend legitimacy to foreign 
terrorist groups—legitimacy that makes it easier for those groups to 
persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds—all of which facilitate 
more terrorist attacks.”108 Al-Shabaab’s online activity during the 
September 21 attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall is the paradigmatic 
example. Al-Shabaab, a designated FTO, was able to collect more than 
15,000 followers by posting details of the vicious attack.109 Although the 
group’s accounts were ultimately suspended, likely for violating Twitter’s 
terms of service prohibiting specific threats of violence,110 al-Shabaab’s 
Twitter activities since 2011 have helped legitimize and strengthen the 
group. Renowned terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman explains this 
phenomenon: 
[A]ll terrorist groups have one trait in common: they do not commit 
actions randomly or senselessly. Each wants maximum publicity to be 
generated by its actions and, moreover, aims at intimidation and 
subjection to attain its objectives. . . . Only by spreading the terror and 
outrage to a much larger audience can the terrorists gain the maximum 
potential leverage that they need to effect fundamental political 
change.111 
 
 105. 150 Cong. Rec. H11,017–18 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Green). 
 106. Id. at 11,022 (statement of Rep. Holt). 
 107. 150 Cong. Rec. S11,939, 11,984 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feingold). 
 108. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 30 (2010). 
 109. Peter Bergen, Are Mass Murderers Using Twitter as a Tool?, CNN (Sept. 27, 2013, 5:28 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/26/opinion/bergen-twitter-terrorism. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism 173–74 (rev. and expanded ed. 2006). 
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The plain language, legislative history, and legislative intent provide 
strong support for a broad understanding of the term “service.” Thus, it 
is clear that social media companies that allow FTOs to use their 
websites are providing a “service.” Two questions remain: (1) whether 
the coordination requirement is satisfied and (2) whether social media 
companies have the requisite intent. 
B. What Does It Mean to Coordinate? 
The HLP Court interpreted the material support statute not to 
prohibit independent advocacy.112 Instead, the Court concluded that 
Congress intended to reach only activities “directed to, coordinated with, 
or controlled by foreign terrorist groups.”113 The Court, however, did not 
clarify how the “coordination” requirement should be understood or 
applied. At oral argument, Justice Scalia recognized the eventual need to 
define “coordination” in responding to Cole’s hypothetical question 
regarding the potential liability of newspapers publishing a Hamas op-
ed.114 Justice Scalia responded that the answer “depends on what 
‘coordinating’ means, doesn’t it? And we can determine that in the next 
case.”115 
Defining coordination in HLP would have better served lower 
courts seeking to apply the HLP decision. Although the distinction 
between speech that is “coordinated with foreign terrorist 
organizations”—and is thus prohibited by the material support statute—
and speech that constitutes independent advocacy may be clear in the 
abstract, application of the test is more complicated.116 In determining 
the liability of social media companies, “the key question would seem to 
be how far one can stretch the meaning of ‘coordination.’”117 
1. Application of Coordination in the Prosecution of Tarek 
Mehanna 
The issue of how to interpret and apply the “coordination” 
requirement of the material support statute did not garner much 
 
 112. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 25. The Court did not clarify what would qualify as 
“independent,” and indeed, it is not clear. One would think that an interpretation permitting 
independent activity would allow an individual to post terrorist propaganda of her own volition on her 
personal social media account. 
 113. Id. at 34. 
 114. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 98, at 14. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Indeed, scholars, journalists, and human rights groups were troubled by the fact that the 
majority declined to specify how much “coordination” would result in a violation of the statute. Peter 
Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of Speech, 63 Hastings 
L.J. 455, 498–99 (2011). 
 117. George Brown, Notes on a Terrorism Trial—Preventative Prosecution, “Material Support” 
and the Role of the Judge after United States v. Mehanna, 4 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 1, 25 (2012). 
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attention until the 2011 prosecution of Tarek Mehanna,118 “one of the 
first cases to apply the test established by the Supreme Court in [HLP] to 
an actual prosecution.”119 The government alleged that Mehanna 
traveled to Yemen to enroll in a terrorist training camp in 2004.120 The 
government also alleged that Mehanna engaged in extensive Internet 
activities, specifically, that he translated and distributed propaganda 
supporting jihad and al-Qaeda.121 The government provided no evidence 
that Mehanna ever met or communicated with anyone from al-Qaeda or 
that his translations were sent to al-Qaeda.122 Rather, the government 
argued that Mehanna’s desire to aid al-Qaeda was sufficient to establish 
liability.123 
The first question the District Court attempted to answer was how a 
trial court should apply the test for criminalizing advocacy of terrorism 
set forth by the Supreme Court.124 In accordance with HLP, the trial 
judge provided the jury with instructions that “a person must be acting in 
coordination with or at the direction of a designated foreign terrorist 
organization,” to be convicted under § 2339B.125 Mehanna was convicted 
and sentenced to more than seventeen years in federal prison.126 
In affirming Mehanna’s conviction, the First Circuit held that the 
trial court adequately instructed the jury.127 However, the court skirted 
the need to decide anything about coordination by affirming Mehanna’s 
conviction on the grounds that his trip to Yemen was sufficient to 
 
 118. See Marty Lederman, Avoidance of the First Amendment Questions in the Mehanna Case, 
Just Security (Nov. 14, 2013, 8:44 AM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/11/14/avoidance-amendment-
questions-mehanna-case. 
 119. Brown, supra note 117, at 2. In United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2011), and 
United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105 (11th Cir. 2011), the Second and Eleventh Circuits 
interpreted the relationship requirement liberally, suggesting that unilateral action on the part of a 
defendant would be enough to support a material support conviction. Brown, supra note 117, at 23–24. 
 120. United States v. Mehanna, 669 F. Supp. 2d 160, 161 (D. Mass. 2011), aff’d 735 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 
2013), and cert. denied, 82 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 13-1125). According to the 
government, the trip was unsuccessful because Mehanna was unable to find a terrorist training camp. 
Id. 
 121. See id. at 162–63. 
 122. David Cole, 39 Ways to Limit Free-Speech, N.Y. Rev. of Books (Apr. 19, 2012, 3:15 PM), 
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/apr/19/39-ways-limit-free-speech. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Brown, supra note 117, at 4. The court also considered how to apply Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403 to the type of evidence likely to be offered in a material support trial and how to 
calculate the sentence upon conviction. Id. at 4–5. 
 125. United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 48 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 82 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. 
Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 13-1125). 
 126. Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tarek Mehanna Sentenced in Boston to 17 
Years in Prison on Terrorism-Related Charges (Apr. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/boston/press-releases/2012/tarek-mehanna-sentenced-in-boston-to-17-years-in-
prison-on-terrorism-related-charges. 
 127. Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 49–50 (citations omitted). 
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support a guilty verdict, even if his Internet activities were 
constitutionally protected.128 
At least one scholar believes the decision sheds light on how to 
interpret the coordination requirement articulated in HLP. Peter 
Margulies believes that the statute, as interpreted by HLP and Mehanna, 
permits posting, translating, or reporting on terrorist videos “because 
you happen to agree” with them, but prohibits taking direction from an 
individual claiming to be acting at the behest of a terrorist 
organization.129 Despite Margulies’ interpretation, the uncertainty 
created by HLP persists, as evidenced by the question Mehanna hoped to 
be addressed by the Supreme Court: “[w]hether a citizen’s political and 
religious speech may constitute a provision of ‘material support or 
resources’ to an FTO under the ‘coordination’ rubric of Humanitarian 
Law Project.”130 The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari only serves to 
perpetuate the confusion. 
2. The Realm of Possible Interpretations as Applied to Social 
Media Companies 
As previously explained, the Court in HLP clarified that Congress 
intended to reach only activities “directed to, coordinated with, or 
controlled by foreign terrorist groups.”131 Additionally, the Court held 
that the term “refers to concerted activity, not independent advocacy.”132 
There are a number of ways courts could interpret this limitation on 
material support. This Subpart seeks to address the possible 
interpretations and whether the activities of social media companies are 
prohibited, notwithstanding the constitutional limits on what § 2339B 
prohibits. 
a. “Directed To” and “Controlled By” 
The first and last elements of the Supreme Court’s analysis—
“directed to” and “controlled by”—can easily be dismissed within the 
context of terrorist organizations using social media. Using the plain 
meaning and dictionary meaning of “directed to,” courts should 
immediately dismiss any theory of liability based on the premise that 
 
 128. Id. at 51. 
 129. Peter Margulies, The First Circuit and the First Amendment, Lawfare Blog (Nov. 15, 2013, 
6:42 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/11/the-first-circuit-and-the-first-amendment. Margulies 
did not explain his logic. 
 130. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Mehanna v. United States, 2014 WL 1090039 (No. 13-1125). 
 131. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 36 (2010). 
 132. Id. at 23–24 (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2075 (1993) (defining 
“service” to mean “the performance of work commanded or paid for by another: a servant’s duty: 
attendance on a superior”; or “an act done for the benefit or at the command of another”). Therefore, 
“independent advocacy . . . is not prohibited by § 2339B.” Id. at 24. 
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social media companies are providing a service directed to FTOs. The 
dictionary definition of “directed to” indicates the phrase means “to say 
(something) to a particular person or group.”133 Social media companies 
aim to serve as many people as possible; this is their business model. 
Thus, social media does not exist to “speak” to any particular group. This 
stands in contrast to HLP’s activity, because HLP expressly intended to 
assist the PKK and LTTE, both designated FTOs. 
Similarly, the plain meaning and dictionary definitions of 
“controlled by” are inapplicable to social media companies. The 
dictionary defines “controlled by” to mean that the target directs the 
behavior of a person or causes a person to do what it wants.134 Barring 
evidence to the contrary, social media companies are entities controlled 
by their executives, board members, or even shareholders. Those 
individuals direct the behavior of social media companies, not FTOs, and 
therefore cannot be said to be “controlled” by FTOs. Although the 
messages distributed through social media are indeed “controlled by” the 
FTO, the service itself—provision of a website through which FTOs 
spread these messages—is not. As a result, the only possible avenue of 
liability for social media sites that allow terrorist organizations to use 
their accounts is if the service is performed “in coordination with” FTOs. 
b. “Coordinated With” 
It is not as simple, however, to dismiss theories of liability based on 
the proposition that social media companies coordinate with FTOs. 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “coordinate” as 
“bring[ing] into a common action, movement or condition: regulat[ing] 
and combin[ing] in harmonious action.”135 The government would have 
several bases for arguing that social media companies coordinate with 
FTOs. First, the government could argue that social media companies are 
working in coordination with FTOs by providing these groups a platform 
from which to spread their message, recruit, and fundraise. Second, social 
media companies benefit from such use of their product because it brings 
traffic to the site that might not exist if not for the presence of such 
groups. Finally, the government could argue that by failing to remove 
known terrorist organizations from their sites, the social media 
companies have failed to act, allowing FTOs to work with their 
supporters in furtherance of their cause. The failure to suspend FTO 
accounts could be seen as a conscious decision that provides evidence of 
 
 133. Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 640 (1993) (defining “direct”). 
 134. Id. at 496–97 (defining “controlled by”). 
 135. Id. at 501 (defining “coordinate”). 
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coordination, particularly as social media companies have the ability to 
monitor and proactively take down these accounts.136 
Indeed, at least one social media company, YouTube, potentially 
has the ability to prevent users from posting terrorist propaganda 
through use of its “Content ID System.”137 The Content ID System was 
initially developed to allow copyright users to “easily identify and 
manage their content on YouTube.”138 The system works by scanning 
videos that are uploaded to YouTube against a database of files that 
content owners have submitted to Google.139 With terrorist propaganda, 
YouTube or any other social media company using a similar system 
could input key words or portions of previously released propaganda 
images or videos to identify potential terrorist activity on their website.140 
A similar system may already be in effect, though the Department 
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) claims the program is “limited to 
gathering information that would help gain operational awareness about 
attacks, disasters or other emerging problems.”141 In 2009, DHS began 
designing a program to monitor social networking websites for “policy 
debates related to the department.”142 The 2011 “Analyst’s Desktop 
Binder,” a reference guide for DHS analysts working on this program, 
provides a list of keywords and search terms to be used when monitoring 
social media websites.143 Social media companies could use this list to 
flag suspicious accounts and subsequently review the accounts or take 
them down. 
Social media companies, however, provide their services to 
hundreds of millions of individuals and entities and would have to 
allocate a large amount of resources to implement such a system. 
Further, it would likely require human review of flagged accounts to 
 
 136. See Keith Wagstaff, Facebook and Instagram Crack Down on Illegal Online Gun Sales, NBC 
News (Mar. 5, 2014, 1:59 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/facebook-instagram-crack-
down-illegal-online-gun-sales-n45316. 
 137. See Katz & Devon, supra note 23. 
 138. How Content ID Works, Google, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en 
(last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
 139. Id. 
 140. The companies could work with the FBI, CIA, or other counterterrorism agencies to come up 
with these words. This would potentially be problematic because the words chosen would likely 
include academic articles or news reports discussing terrorism. Indeed, YouTube and Google received 
a large amount of criticism during the implementation of the Content ID System because of the wide 
net it cast over legitimate uploads. See, e.g., Paul Tassi, The Injustice of the YouTube Content ID 
Crackdown Reveals Google’s Dark Side, Forbes (Dec. 19, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/insertcoin/2013/12/19/the-injustice-of-the-youtube-content-id-crackdown-reveals-googles-dark-side. 
 141. Charlie Savage, Homeland Analysts Told to Monitor Policy Debates in Social Media, N.Y. 
Times (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/us/house-questions-homeland-security-
program-on-social-media.html. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Analyst’s Desktop Binder 20–23 (2011), available at 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/296596-analyst-desktop-binder-redacted.html. 
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know whether an account was genuinely connected to an FTO or was 
merely someone using the organization’s name. Therefore, because 
social media companies have not “made arrangements with” or “worked 
with the FTO,” they should not be seen as having “coordinated” with an 
FTO, although the statute could be interpreted in this manner. Although 
social media companies could screen for terrorist accounts on their own, 
the First Amendment would be implicated if the government directed 
such screening.144 
c. “Concerted Activity” 
It is unclear whether satisfying the coordination requirement is 
sufficient to satisfy the concerted activity requirement.145 The text and 
structure of the Court’s decision in HLP suggests that proving 
coordination is all that is required under § 2339B because, once 
coordination exists, the activity is no longer independent of the FTO. 
However, if the concerted activity requirement is a separate prong, it is 
likely to be the biggest obstacle for any hypothetical prosecution. The 
dictionary defines “concerted” as “plan[ning] together: settl[ing] or 
adjust[ing] by conference, agreement, or consultation”; “act[ing] in 
harmony or conjunction: form[ing] combined plans.”146 In accordance 
with this definition, the government could contend that the social media 
companies’ failure to suspend FTO accounts is deliberate behavior the 
companies knew would assist the FTO. To rebut this assertion, the 
companies would contend there is nothing planned or deliberate about 
the way in which terrorist organizations use their product, at least on 
their part; rather, it is merely a result of the companies’ business models. 
It is impossible to predict how courts would react to the question of 
whether social media companies have acted in coordination with FTOs, 
or whether they have engaged in concerted activity prohibited by the 
statute. The dictionary definitions, in addition to the case law, could lead 
to conflicting, yet equally plausible, results; this Note need not resolve 
the outcome. This uncertainty, however, suggests it is plausible that 
social media companies are providing a service prohibited by the 
material support statute—the social media accounts of terrorist groups 
benefit the FTO and the activity is, at least arguably, “directed to, 
coordinated with, or controlled by foreign terrorist groups,”147 and is 
therefore not independent of the FTO. 
 
 144. See infra Part IV.B. 
 145. The Court held that the term “service” “refers to concerted activity, not independent 
advocacy.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 23 (2010). 
 146. Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 470 (1993). 
 147. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 36. 
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C. Do Social Media Companies Have the Requisite Mens Rea? 
The final difficulty of prosecuting of social media companies is 
whether there is evidence sufficient to support a finding that social media 
companies possessed knowledge about users’ connections to terrorism.148 
The knowledge required to be criminally liable may be clear in some 
instances, where, for example, the material support provided is recruiting 
individuals to join al-Qaeda. However, if the support is innocent or 
neutral on its face, as would seem to be the case with social media 
websites, the mens rea question is more complicated. HLP did not 
address this question because it was “undisputed that the plaintiffs’ 
support would have been provided directly to two groups that were 
designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the State 
Department.”149 
To find the donor liable under § 2339B, “[t]he prosecution [must] 
prove that a donor provided material support to an organization knowing 
either that the organization was a designated FTO, or that it engaged or 
engages in terrorist activity or terrorism.”150 What this means, 
particularly when knowledge is not overt, is unclear because “defendants 
in typical material support cases . . . satisf[y] a more stringent intent 
requirement.”151 
Social media companies will reject any assertion that they knew they 
were providing a service to designated FTOs, claiming there is no way 
for them to know who is using their services. For example, approximately 
one billion people use Facebook152 in over seventy languages.153 Twitter, 
which is offered in over twenty-one languages,154 has over 200 million 
users each day.155 The essential question is whether the sheer number of 
 
 148. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(1) (2014). Conviction under § 2339B does not require a specific intent 
to further the goals of the terrorist organization; it requires only knowledge about the organization’s 
connection to terrorism. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 16–17. 
 149. Abecassis v. Wyatt, 785 F. Supp. 2d 614, 632 (S.D. Tex. 2011). 
 150. United States v. Warsame, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1021 (D. Minn. 2008) (citation omitted); see 
also United States v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1070 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (holding that § 2339B 
requires “proof that [the] Defendant provided material support knowing either that the recipient was 
a designated FTO or had engaged in terrorist activity”). 
 151. Sam Adelsberg et al., Note, The Chilling Effect of the “Material Support” Law on Humanitarian 
Aid: Causes, Consequences, and Proposed Reforms, 4 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 282, 290 (2013). 
 152. Ashlee Vance, Facebook: The Making of 1 Billion Users, Bloomberg Businessweek (Oct. 4, 
2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-10-04/facebook-the-making-of-1-billion-users. 
 153. Localization & Translation, Facebook, https://developers.facebook.com/docs/internationalization 
(last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
 154. Twitter, In Your Language, Twitter (Jan. 6, 2012, 5:20 PM), 
https://blog.twitter.com/2012/twitter-in-your-language. 
 155. Karen Wickre, Celebrating #Twitter7, Twitter (Mar. 21, 2013, 7:42 AM), 
https://blog.twitter.com/ 
2013/celebrating-twitter7. 
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users and the variety in languages makes it impossible to know the 
identity of each user as required by the statute.  
Until recently, the evidence was inconclusive, as social media 
companies shuttered some terrorist accounts but not others. For 
example, although Facebook took down al-Shabaab’s English language 
accounts, it never removed the group’s Arabic and Somali accounts even 
though the accounts posted the same material.156 Furthermore, after the 
brutal execution of reporter James Foley, Twitter and YouTube began 
aggressively cracking down on accounts affiliated with ISIL.157 This swift 
and decisive action suggests that these companies have the ability to 
identify and shut down accounts affiliated with FTOs despite the large 
number of users. To prove that it is indeed possible for these companies 
to take down all accounts affiliated with FTOs and that they have the 
requisite knowledge, the government could rely upon the collective 
knowledge theory and the notoriety theory. 
The collective knowledge theory asserts that the aggregate of 
compartmentalized knowledge of a corporation’s employees constitutes 
the corporation’s knowledge of a particular operation, regardless of 
whether the employees administering one component know the specific 
activities of employees administering another.158 Generally, “[a] 
collective knowledge instruction is entirely appropriate in the context of 
corporate criminal liability” because the acts of a corporation are simply 
the acts of all its employees acting within the scope of their 
employment.159 Therefore, if the government puts forward evidence 
sufficient to support a finding that any employee, within the scope of her 
employment, knew that FTOs were using the social media site, that 
knowledge would be sufficient to support a finding of corporate 
knowledge. 
Finding one employee, or possibly several, with such knowledge 
would not necessarily be challenging. For example, in October 2013, 
Twitter suspended twelve known jihadi accounts.160 A few days later, 
Twitter reinstated two of the accounts.161 The reinstatement of the 
accounts suggests that someone reviewed the accounts and determined 
 
 156. Deana Kjuka, When Terrorists Take to Social Media, Atlantic (Feb. 20, 2013, 9:15 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/02/when-terrorists-take-to-social-media/273321. 
 157. See Gareth Browne, Twitter Cracks down on Isil Accounts, Gulf News (Aug. 20, 2014, 
1:51 PM), http://gulfnews.com/news/region/iraq/twitter-cracks-down-on-isil-accounts-1.1374349; Jeff 
Stone, Blocked on Twitter and YouTube, ISIS Turns to Diaspora and VKontakte to Disseminate 
Message, Int’l Bus. Times (Aug. 22, 2014, 3:52 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/blocked-twitter-youtube-
isis-turns-diaspora-vkontakte-disseminate-message-1666758. 
 158. United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 159. Id. (citations omitted). 
 160. J.M. Berger, Twitter (Oct. 7, 2013, 11:17 AM), 
https://twitter.com/intelwire/status/387280656616538112.  
 161. Id. 
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that they did not violate Twitter policy.162 A collective knowledge 
instruction would allow for a finding of knowledge as applied to the 
reinstated accounts.163 However, without this type of evidence, employee 
testimony, or evidence gathered by surveillance, it might be difficult to 
prove the requisite knowledge under the collective knowledge theory. 
Use of the “notoriety theory” in tandem with the collective 
knowledge theory would strengthen the assertion that these companies 
know the identity of the end user. The notoriety theory proposes that, in 
some instances, “the fact that an organization engages in terrorist 
activities may be of such widespread notoriety that the government can 
[easily] persuade a jury of the defendant’s knowledge.”164 This theory 
would be sufficient to prove knowledge because the requirement of 
knowledge may be established “if a person is aware of a high probability 
of [the fact’s] existence.”165 When used with the collective knowledge 
theory, this would mean that when even one employee becomes aware 
that an account belongs to an FTO, this knowledge would be imputed to 
the corporation. 
For example, it would be absurd to propose that, as of 2013, not one 
single employee knows that al-Qaeda is an FTO and that not one single 
employee knows that al-Qaeda uses that same social media website in an 
“official” capacity. The notoriety theory combined with the collective 
knowledge theory would lead to a finding that the social media company 
knew that it was providing a service to al-Qaeda. This would be sufficient 
to satisfy the knowledge requirement of the material support statutes. 
Further, in conjunction with the notice provided by media reports on the 
issue, and government requests to take down certain accounts presumed 
to be affiliated with FTOs, it would be difficult to argue the opposite. 
This may be a more difficult question where less notorious groups are the 
subject of concern. 
Thus, the material support statutes can be read to prohibit allowing 
terrorist groups to use social media accounts. First, the breadth of the 
definition of “material support or resources” provides a clear pathway to 
finding that social media companies are providing a “service” to FTOs. 
This is reinforced by the Court’s recognition that “material support of a 
terrorist group’s lawful activities facilitates the group’s ability to attract 
 
 162. See My Account Is Suspended, Twitter, https://support.twitter.com/articles/15790-my-account-
is-suspended (last visited Dec. 14, 2014) (“Accounts are generally suspended for violation of the Twitter 
Rules”). The Twitter rules do not per se prohibit terrorists from using the website. See The Twitter Rules, 
Twitter Support, https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
 163. This assumes that the content on the accounts made it fairly obvious they belonged to FTOs. 
 164. Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derived from the 
(Early) Model Penal Code, 1 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 5, 28 (2005). 
 165. Model Penal Code § 2.02(7) (2001). 
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‘funds,’ ‘financing,’ and ‘goods’ that will further its terrorist acts.”166 
Second, the coordination requirement can easily be interpreted to cover 
the activities of social media companies, particularly as they likely have 
the means to act, but have not done so. Finally, the Court created a lower 
burden on prosecutors when it rejected a specific intent requirement. 
Instead, prosecutors only need to prove that a social media company had 
knowledge (or “knew”) that a terrorist group used an account on the 
website. All of this is compounded by the fact that, as common sense 
would suggest, juries are not particularly sympathetic to supporters of 
terrorism, and Congress intended the material support statutes to cover a 
wide array of conduct. This result is not advisable for a number of 
reasons discussed in Part IV, which also provides recommendations 
moving forward. 
IV.  Recommendations 
Courts should not find social media companies liable for providing 
material support to terrorists for two reasons should such litigation arise: 
(1) in accordance with the rule of lenity, courts should construe the 
Supreme Court’s requirement of “coordination” in HLP narrowly, and 
(2) the companies should have a valid First Amendment defense. 
Additionally, Congress should amend the law to require specific intent to 
further the goals of the FTO. 
A. Narrow Construction—Judicial Interpretation 
Courts should limit the application of the material support statutes 
in a way that does not infringe upon rights protected by the First 
Amendment. As applied to social media, the constitutionality of the 
material support statute would undoubtedly become an issue. In such 
circumstances, courts must first “ascertain whether a construction of the 
statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be 
avoided,”167 and subsequently interpret the statute to avoid the 
question.168 Given that overregulation of social media would chill speech, 
and that the dangers are too speculative to warrant an infringement on 
the First Amendment, courts should interpret the statute so as not to 
reach social media companies operating within the bounds of legal 
activity.169 
 
 166. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 32 n.6 (2010) (quoting Declaration of 
Kenneth R. McKune, U.S. Dep’t of State, Joint App. at 134–36 (Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 
(No. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 3877534, at *134–36). 
 167. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 168. United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994) (noting “that a statue is to be 
construed where fairly possible so as to avoid substantial constitutional questions”). 
 169. For example, a company created with the intent of encouraging individuals to attack the 
United States or U.S. citizens would not be operating within the bounds of legal activity. 
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One method of interpreting the statute such that it comports with 
constitutional demands would be by narrowly defining “coordination.” 
Not only would this interpretation avoid implicating the First 
Amendment, but it would also prevent the prosecution of entities that, 
more likely than not, oppose the unlawful actions of FTOs. One way to 
narrow the statutory reach would be for courts to interpret 
“coordination” to require a “meeting of the minds” between the 
individual providing the service and the FTO, such that the service is 
made in support of the FTO’s objective. A “meeting of the minds” 
conveys the idea of “mutual assent” on a bargain between two parties170 
and may be inferred from conduct.171 In this context, such a theory would 
essentially impose a stronger intent requirement, thus creating a safe 
harbor from prosecution for those who do not provide the service for the 
purpose of supporting the FTO’s objective. 
As applied to social media companies, this would raise the bar as to 
what the government would have to prove. Essentially, this would 
require the government to prove that by failing to ban FTOs from their 
sites, the company impliedly supported the FTO’s objective. For 
example, strong evidence of a meeting of the minds would exist where, 
after a sufficient time had passed the social media company refused to 
take down certain accounts the government had requested it to take 
down. There is no way to predict whether a jury would buy into this 
theory and this method has downsides. For example, this approach would 
not address the overregulation and censorship likely to occur as a result 
of the wide reach of the statute, and would give the government broad 
discretion to act. 
Another approach would be to interpret “coordination” to require 
an agreement to legitimize and assist the FTO. The requirement of an 
agreement would still allow the DOJ to prosecute, and thus prevent, a 
wide array of activities, yet would protect happenstance from appearing 
to be coordination. For example, in the case of social media, one would 
be hard pressed to find that a social media company providing a service 
to an FTO agreed to legitimize and assist the group. The conclusion that 
social media companies did not agree to legitimize or assist the FTOs 
using their sites may be inferred from the fact that social media 
companies provide services to hundreds of millions of users and do not 
claim to support each and every one of their viewpoints, nor do they 
claim to support their actions. This would allow the DOJ to reach the 
 
 170. See Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 107 (1952). 
 171. See Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923) (defining an implied 
agreement as an agreement “founded upon a meeting of minds, which, although not embodied in an 
express contract, is inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties”). 
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intended targets of the service component of the statute—those who, for 
example, recruit new members on behalf of the FTO. 
B. First Amendment Defense and Censorship by Proxy 
Alternatively, courts should allow social media companies to claim 
the First Amendment as a defense. The First Amendment guarantees the 
freedom of speech and association;172 however, these rights are not 
unlimited. Powerful state interests can permit the limitation of rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.173 For this reason, government 
efforts to restrict speech during wartime are entitled greater deference.174 
Furthermore, the First Amendment does not protect speech that is likely 
to incite imminent lawless action175 or speech that creates a clear and 
present danger of a substantive evil.176 
In line with decades of First Amendment jurisprudence, and the 
Court’s recognition that “the Government’s interest in combating 
terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order,”177 the government 
could constitutionally punish speech encouraging specific acts of 
terrorism. FTO activity on social media, however, is too speculative to 
warrant a general infringement on the corporations’ First Amendment 
rights.178 Additionally, given the length of the “war on terror,” a 
determination that social media activity warrants censorship—because it 
is either likely to incite imminent, unlawful action or because it creates a 
clear and present danger—would quickly lead to the prohibition of other 
lawful activity. Perhaps David Cole put it best: 
History shows us that it is in moments of great fear that governments 
are most likely to target speech and association. . . . Modern First 
Amendment doctrine . . . was formulated in response to the excesses of 
the McCarthy era. But when the Court allows unsupported speculation 
 
 172. U.S. Const. amend I. Recent Supreme Court decisions establish that corporations have First 
Amendment rights. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 173. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (citing United States v. O’Brien, 
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)) (“[A] content-neutral regulation will be sustained under the First 
Amendment if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free 
speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.”). 
 174. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (stating that “[w]hen a nation is at war many 
things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not 
be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any 
constitutional right”). 
 175. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
 176. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
 177. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010). 
 178. This may not always be the case, but it is more likely than not to be true. An assertion 
otherwise would require a case-by-case analysis. 
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about “terrorism” and disapproval of a speaker’s viewpoint . . . we 
appear to be repeating history rather than learning from it.179 
Furthermore, prosecuting social media companies under the material 
support statute would result in censorship by proxy180 and would have a 
chilling effect on Internet activity.181 Fear of prosecution is likely to lead 
to an overregulation of content on social media sites, which would 
restrict individual rights and cripple the right to speak freely. However 
reprehensible we may find the ideology espoused by FTOs, the First 
Amendment guarantees members, or even nonmembers, the right to 
freely express their support.182 Whether speech is “in coordination with” 
or “under the direction of” an FTO should make no difference. 
Additionally, overregulation would adversely affect the free flow of 
information we have come to value from the Internet. Forcing social 
media companies to choose between serving as a medium in which 
individuals can freely express their opinions and committing a crime or 
prohibiting the free expression of ideas is no choice at all. Such a threat 
would severely restrict the ability of social media companies to do what 
they set out to do, “to give people the power to share and make the 
world more open and connected.”183 Although censorship by private 
actors is not unconstitutional,184 it is nonetheless problematic when done 
at the behest of the government. Therefore, courts should allow social 
media companies to assert their First Amendment rights as an 
affirmative defense to any prosecution.  
Social media companies should be able to successfully defend their 
“failure” to shut down these accounts by arguing that forcing them to do 
so would amount to censorship by proxy185 and impermissibly implicate 
the Constitution. Although we may not feel any compunction in 
criminalizing Tarek Mehanna’s speech, or even the actions at issue in 
HLP, extending the doctrine to more questionable cases should cause us 
to consider the protections that we are willing to forfeit in the name of 
national security. Indeed, if “the U.S. were to pressure [social media 
companies] to censor [posts] by organizations it opposes, even those on 
 
 179. David Cole, The Roberts Court vs. Free Speech, 57 N.Y. Rev. Books 80, 81 (Aug. 19, 2010), 
available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1423&context=facpub. 
 180. Censorship by proxy occurs when governments enlist private actors “as proxy censors to 
control the flow of information.” Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, 
Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 11, 11 (2006). 
 181. Twitter’s and YouTube’s recent act of essentially censoring ISIL from their websites may 
suggest that the companies can effectively ban FTOs from having accounts without chilling speech. See 
supra note 157 and accompanying text. The impact of this action, however, remains unknown. 
 182. See generally Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 183. About, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/facebook?v=info (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
 184. See What is Censorship?, Am. Civil Liberties Union (Aug. 30, 2006), 
https://www.aclu.org/free-speech/what-censorship. 
 185. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
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the terrorist list, it would join the ranks of countries like India, 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Syria, and Uzbekistan, all of which have censored 
online speech in the name of ‘national security.’”186 Ensuring national 
security is essential to the continued existence of the United States, but 
safeguarding our liberties is equally necessary to further the Framers’ 
intent.187 
C. Legislative Fixes 
In the event that courts fail to limit the statutory reach of § 2339B 
and the defense of the First Amendment is unsuccessful, the legislature 
should intervene and amend the statute. While this is unlikely, given the 
fear of being perceived as soft on terrorism, a statutory amendment 
clarifying the intended reach of the statute would be beneficial and 
ultimately in line with counterterrorism policy concerns. Furthermore, 
the legislative history of the statute suggests that at least some members 
of Congress were opposed to the breadth of the definition of “material 
support or resources,” but expediency and national security fears 
warranted against any substantial narrowing.188 
1. Policy Argument in Favor of Narrowing Section 2339B’s Reach 
Narrowing the reach of the material support statute is in line with 
U.S. policy concerns. First, the law enforcement and intelligence 
communities can monitor FTO accounts and gather actionable 
intelligence regarding future activities.189 Second, attempting to target all 
purported FTO accounts may be a waste of valuable resources. When 
accounts are shuttered, new accounts often sprout up in their stead. For 
example, in the wake of the Westgate attack in Nairobi, Twitter shut 
down al-Shabaab’s official account.190 However, “[Shabaab] quickly 
 
 186. Trevor Timm & Jillian York, U.S. Government Threatens Free Speech With Calls for Twitter 
Censorship, Elec. Frontier Found. (Jan. 6, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/01/us-
government-calls-censor-twitter-threaten-free-speech. Freedom House ranks these countries as either 
“partially free” or not free. Freedom on the Net: 2013 Global Scores, Freedom House, 
http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net-2013-global-scores (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
 187. Joseph Postell, Securing Liberty: The Purpose and Importance of the Bill of Rights, Heritage 
Found. (Dec. 14, 2007), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/12/securing-liberty-the-
purpose-and-importance-of-the-bill-of-rights (The Framers signed the Bill of Rights to “assist citizens 
in the task of defending their liberties.”). 
 188. See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text. 
 189. See Mary Noble, Why Doesn’t The US Government Destroy Terrorist Websites, Politix 
(May 15, 2013), http://politix.topix.com/homepage/6017-why-doesnt-the-us-government-destroy-
terrorist-websites. Others disagree, opining that shutting down these accounts can provide more 
intelligence than allowing them to persist. Id. Monitoring accounts may raise other constitutional 
concerns that need not be resolved by this Note. 
 190. David Barnett, Are You Looking At An Official Shabaab Twitter Account?, Long War J. 
(Sept. 25, 2013, 9:36 AM), http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/09/are_you_looking_ 
at_an_official.php. 
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returned to the social media platform.”191 This pattern is not unique. 
Experts have found that when “[a] Facebook or Twitter account 
affiliated or run by a terrorist organization is thrown into the spotlight, 
activists and the media buzz about it, [and] it is suspended by the social 
network . . . a new account [usually] emerges [soon thereafter].”192 
Moreover, “[t]he loss of an official . . . account would by no means 
silence terrorist groups. Instead, it would make them go through the 
inconvenience of relying on less centrally-accessible sock puppet 
accounts or fanboys to repost messages and links from other outlets.”193 
Though this could be a positive outcome in the minds of some because it 
would potentially redirect terrorist resources, it would also redirect U.S. 
counterterrorism resources to chasing after these websites. These 
patterns suggest that the law enforcement and intelligence communities 
might be better served by monitoring the more readily apparent social 
media accounts than continuing to play a “high-tech game of whack-a-
mole.”194 
Finally, a policy of closing accounts has been used as propaganda 
against the United States and may be counterproductive. In 2012, in 
response to a New York Times article suggesting that the U.S. 
government was considering legal options to prevent al-Shabaab from 
using social media, the group’s spokesperson tweeted, “How many 
accounts would #US government be able to close before realizing the 
futility of their attempt? They need a team now to monitor HSM!”195 
Instead of achieving the intended result of condemning Twitter and al-
Shabaab, an additional 3000 people began to follow the al-Shabaab 
account.196 This incident suggests it may be better to leave the accounts 
in place and use them as a source of intelligence.197 
2. Suggested Congressional Changes 
In line with the foregoing policy reasons, Congress should amend 
the definition of “material support and resources.” One option is for 
Congress to require materiality in the support proffered, particularly 
where speech is concerned. In his HLP dissent, Justice Breyer stated 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Kjuka, supra note 156. 
 193. Adam Rawnsley, Twitterfight! Group Threatens Lawsuit Over Terror Tweets, Wired (Jan. 2, 
2012, 8:52 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/01/twitterfight-group-threatens-lawsuit-over-
terror-tweets. 
 194. J.M. Berger, #Unfollow: The Case for Kicking Terrorists Off Twitter, Foreign Policy 
(Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/20/unfollow. 
 195. Id. (quoting al-Shabaab’s media wing’s Twitter handle @HSMPress). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Another option is the creation of government accounts designed to engage with the FTO, 
challenge their portrayal of information, and try to reach the hearts and minds of the FTO’s followers. 
The State Department is currently employing this tactic with its Twitter handle @ThinkAgain_DOS. 
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“where support consists of pure speech or association . . . the 
Government [should] have to prove that the defendant knew he was 
providing support significantly likely to help the organization pursue its 
unlawful terrorist aims.”198 Mere suspicion that the proffered service 
could help the FTO would not be sufficient to render a conviction. This 
amendment might not exculpate social media companies, as there is no 
question that social media use can greatly increase the legitimacy of an 
FTO. 
Congress could instead require that an individual providing a service 
have the specific intent to further the illegal ends of the FTO in order to 
be convicted. The HLP court rejected this approach to effectuate what 
they understood to be congressional intent to require only “knowledge 
about the organization’s connection to terrorism, not specific intent.”199 
A congressional amendment would serve the dual purpose of overruling 
the Supreme Court’s decision and providing a safeguard against a 
potentially unconstitutional application of the statute. An amendment 
requiring specific intent would protect social media companies, 
researchers, and journalists, among others, who might be convicted for 
illegally providing material support to an FTO, even though that 
provision of support was not intended to actually assist the FTO. 
According to Justice Breyer, 
This reading of the statute protects those who engage in pure speech 
and association ordinarily affected by the First Amendment. But it 
does not protect that activity where a defendant purposefully intends it 
to help terrorism or where a defendant knows (or willfully blinds 
himself to the fact) that the activity is significantly likely to assist 
terrorism.200 
Alternatively, Congress could enact a statute that specifically 
addresses the dangers posed by FTO use of the Internet. At least one 
scholar has proposed an internet-specific material support statute that 
would criminalize the establishment and maintenance of Internet 
websites or posts with the specific intent to perpetrate acts of 
terrorism.201 Alan Williams suggests that the government can and should 
“prosecute certain Internet activities that tend to support terrorists,” 
which requires an Internet-specific statute to address the implicated 
constitutional concerns.202 Although this is a viable alternative to 
construing the material support statute more narrowly, improving the 
existing statute is a better alternative given the complexities involved in 
 
 198. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 58–59 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
 199. Id. at 16–17 (majority opinion). 
 200. Id. at 56 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 201. Alan Williams, Prosecuting Website Development Under the Material Support to Terrorism 
Statutes: Time to Fix What’s Broken, 11 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 365, 383–84 (2007). 
 202. Id. at 367, 383–84. 
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interpreting newly enacted statutes and the difficulty in getting Congress 
to take action. 
Conclusion 
Judge Selya on the First Circuit compared terrorism to the bubonic 
plague, insisting it is an existential threat that warrants “fierce” 
enforcement of criminal laws and requires “court[s] to patrol the fine line 
between vital national security concerns and forbidden encroachments 
on constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and association.”203 
It is one thing to provide weapons and currency to an FTO, but it is 
quite another to provide an FTO with access to a large group of people 
who may or may not be susceptible to its message. Although social media 
may increase an FTO’s legitimacy, that danger does not warrant Internet 
censorship or a violation of decades of First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Policy concerns equally advise against such a broad interpretation of the 
statute. Both the judiciary and the legislature have a responsibility to 
protect the Constitution and should take that responsibility seriously. 
One can hope that we do not come to view our actions in the war on 
terror with the same regret as we do McCarthyism. 
 
 203. United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 82 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. 
Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 13-1125). 
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